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Abstract
The Personal Distributed Environment, or PDE, represents a new
concept of a computer network that takes a user-centric view of per-
sonal devices to create a purely virtual personal network. A PDE
integrates all devices that are relevant to a user, regardless of their
location, current role, or their specific capabilities. In this paper we
present an overview of the PDE concept and describe how such an
environment may be constructed. Since the user’s devices may be lo-
cated in several different security domains, our focus is on the secure
initialisation of the PDE and to that end, we introduce a step-by-
step procedure describing how user’s devices will join the network in
a secure manner.
1 Introduction
A traditional computer network may be thought of as a collection of com-
puters, physically connected by wires, so that they can communicate with
each other and share resources. The fact that all devices in such a network
are connected by wires, offers an inherent level of security: these devices
can only communicate if they are physically connected. Shielding physical
access to a computer network, or perimeter security, offers protection from in-
truders. Moreover, traditional computer networks employ security gateways,
such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems, at the edge of the network
to implement security measures and to monitor all traffic that accesses the
network.
To provide remote access to their internal network, many organisations
employ Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology. VPNs send data over
the public Internet through secure tunnels. In a VPN, a level of security
corresponding to traditional networks is achieved through encrypting and
encapsulating the transmitted data, for example using IPsec [5].
More recently, wireless communication technologies, such as IEEE 802.11
[13] or Bluetooth [3], are being used to extend the traditional networking
concept even further with mobile devices that join and leave a computer
network spontaneously. The security of wireless access points is problematic
because the wireless nature subverts the physical security mechanisms of a
traditional network [4].
VPNs and wireless communications represent two reasons why the con-
cept of the computer network is becoming less well defined, and why new
techniques have to be developed to achieve a level of security comparable to
traditional computer networks.
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With the Personal Distributed Environment (PDE) [6, 19], we go one
step further and create a dynamic and heterogeneous network that exists
purely on a virtual level. It is constructed from all the devices that relate
to one specific user. That is, devices that are owned by the user, to which
they have access rights, or through which they receive data or services. The
PDE is, therefore, a user-centric implimentation of a global dynamic and
heterogeneous communication network.
The heterogeneous nature of the PDE arises from the fact that consumers
will purchase devices to meet a wide range of needs. Such consumer devices
are normally used with limited connectivity in the different living environ-
ments of the user. For example, their home, office, car, or personal surround-
ings. These devices may be fixed or mobile, and may communicate using a
broad range of wired or wireless communication technologies. Furthermore,
the devices’ capabilities and their role in the PDE differ tremendously.
Given this environment, the task of constructing the PDE and manag-
ing connectivity presents a significant research challenge. Providing security
within the PDE presents a further challenge for the following reasons:
• The PDE is a purely virtual network. Physical security mechanisms and
dedicated security gateway technology are, therefore, not applicable.
This means that security mechanisms need to be implemented purely
in software and, furthermore, need to be ubiquitous throughout the
PDE.
• A PDE consists of devices originating in different environments which
implement different legacy security systems. In practice, then, any PDE
security mechanisms must take existing security systems into account.
The PDE cannot, therefore, impose any security mechanisms, but must
support a wide range of legacy systems.
• The PDE incorporates wireless as well as wired communication tech-
nologies. Wireless communication is inherently insecure and the PDE
incorporates a wide spectrum of wireless technologies which results in
a heterogeneous environment.
• The PDE is dynamic in nature, the user and many of their devices are
mobile. Consequently, not all devices will be available at all times.
To create a PDE the construction of a mapping table is proposed, that
maps physical devices in different environments onto logical PDE compo-
nents. This mapping table primarily contains information on devices, and
management information for the PDE. The information in the mapping table
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must be made available to all parts of the PDE. Once this basic information
is available, the relevant security parameters, that fulfill the desired security
services within the PDE, can be determined. With this paper, we take a
first step towards designing a security architecture for the PDE by consid-
ering how the mapping table is created, and how it is filled with relevant
information when the PDE is initialised.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarises related work,
and section 3 then presents an overview of the PDE concept. Since the
concept of the PDE and its objectives are new, and differ in many respects
from existing applications of virtual networks, section 4 formulates a number
of general assumptions about the PDE. We use these assumptions as a basis
for the initialisation procedure described in section 5. In addition to adding of
new devices to create the PDE, devices also have to be removed, for example,
if they are compromised or become obsolete. This is briefly addressed in
section 6. Section 7 contains conclusions and an outlook on future work.
2 Related Work
A number of research initiatives exist that are similar to the work on the Per-
sonal Distributed Environment being carried out by the Mobile VCE1. For
example Grid Computing, Pervasive Computing, and more recently, the IST
MAGNET project2. Since the PDE is a purely virtual network, we looked
at these other research initiatives focussing on virtual networks, mainly Grid
computing systems which are built on the concept of the Virtual Organisa-
tion. What the PDE offers in addition to Grid and Pervasive computing,
is that the PDE is primarily a user centric, personal network, as opposed
to a multi-user computing resource. Furthermore, the PDE is focussed on
communications between personal mobile devices rather than the interaction
with smart spaces envisaged by Pervasive computing, or the sharing compu-
tational resources and data, as is the objective of the Grid community. The
objectives of both the MAGNET project and the Mobile VCE work follow
the vision expressed by the Wireless World Research Forum3 (WWRF). The
WWRF is a global collaboration of industrialists and academics who envis-
age a concept like the PDE, known as the MultiSphere [14]. The scope of
the IST MAGNET project is closest to that of the Mobile VCE, but this is
relatively new work, the project being launched 2004.
1www.mobilevce.com
2www.telecom.ece.ntua.gr/magnet/
3www.wireless-world-research.org
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Grid Computing: The concept of a personal virtual network has strong
parallels with that of the Virtual Organisation, the model used in
computational Grids [7, 8]. This technology represents a mature, al-
beit wired, virtual environment. From a security perspective, however,
many of the problems arising in Grid technology also arise in the PDE.
For example, both environments are faced with the challenge of inte-
grating numerous isolated security domains where each domain may
have its own security policy and run specific security protocols. A
comparison of the PDE and Grid environments is given in [20], which
suggests how Grid security may be applied to resolve some of the prob-
lems in the PDE.
Pervasive Computing: Further parallels may be found in the field of Per-
vasive Computing [9,18] which, like the PDE, is concerned with deliver-
ing personalised services to users. Unlike the PDE, however, the means
by which this accomplished is through the use of smart spaces. The
focus of the PDE, on the other hand, is the construction of a personal
network for an individual user. Consequently, much of the PDE work
concerns the details of how to construct this heterogeneous network
based on the user’s local Bluetooth, WiFi, or UMTS networks. This
construction therefore requires some degree of interaction between the
user and the various network operators [16]. However, as with Grid
computing, the security issues facing Pervasive computing share many
similarities with PDE.
WWRF: The Wireless World Research Forum has its roots in an earlier
EU-IST programme, the Wireless Strategic Initiative (WSI). The WSI
invited a Think Tank of industrial and academic experts to contribute
to a “Book of Visions 2000” [14]. This report describes mobile com-
munications technologies, and business models, expected to become
operational in the next decade. The WSI subsequently decided to de-
velop this Think Tank into an open forum and as a result the WWRF
was launched in 2001 [15]. Working to similar timeframes and with
similar objectives, the WWRF continues the work of the WSI Think
Tank and has produced a revised “Book of Visions 2001” [21]. In com-
mon with the PDE, the WWRF MultiSphere is based on a user-centric
approach. The MultiSphere models layers of wireless communications
technologies as concentric spheres with the user at the centre. Layer 1 is
the PAN environment; layer 2 includes devices in the user’s immediate
surroundings and subsequent layers include longer range communica-
tions. The outer layer of the MultiSphere, layer 6, visualises a“personal
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cyberworld” of communications and services.
MAGNET: In contrast to the mature technologies of Grid and Pervasive
computing, MAGNET is a new initiative. MAGNET (My personal
Adaptive Global NET) is an integrated project supported within the
Sixth Framework Programme of the EU Commission and started out in
January 2004. The MAGNET concept of the Personal Network incor-
porates the same basic ideas of the Mobile VCE PDE. According to the
goals described on the IST-MAGNET web site, “the MAGNET overall
objectives are to design, develop, demonstrate and validate the concept
of a flexible Personal Network that supports resource-efficient, robust,
ubiquitous service provisioning in a secure, heterogeneous networking
environment for nomadic users. Of paramount importance is the re-
quirement that a Personal Network will support the user in both private
and business activities, while safeguarding the security and privacy of
the users and their data.”
3 Overview of the PDE
Dunlop et al. [6] describe the PDE as “encompassing a user perspective of
multiple devices (both local and remote) accessing multiple services via mul-
tiple networks, all of which can be changing dynamically”. This concept goes
further than just accessing content, but harnesses the PDE capabilities in
novel ways to create a new and diverse range of services for the user.
PDE devices are typically those devices that play a role in the user’s
private and professional environments. It is anticipated that there will be
around 20 devices in a PDE, originating in different environments. Each
environment forms its own PDE sub-network, for example in the
• home environment: the home PC, printer, set-top box (STB), HiFi, or
even refrigerator;
• office environment: the office PC, printer, or projector;
• car environment: car radio , navigation system, and alarm; and the
• personal surroundings: PDA, smart phone, blood pressure monitor.
In describing the PDE, we distinguish between two classes of devices, home
devices and foreign devices, depending on their origin:
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Home devices: These are devices that are, at least partially, controlled by
the user. There are two possibilities where a device may be considered
a home device, namely:
1. The device is owned by the user. In this case, the user has administrator
rights on the device. The device may be shared with other users.
2. The device is not owned by the user, but belongs to somebody else (for
example, an office PC). However, the user has access rights, an account,
on the device.
For home devices, although the user may be the same for a number of devices,
the user ID may differ from device to device.
Foreign devices: These are devices that are not controlled by the user. In
this case, the device is owned by a third party and the user has no
dedicated account on the device. Examples are devices that deliver a
service, such as display or sensor functionality, that the user wants to
make available to their PDE.
Both home and foreign devices may be static or mobile, and they may
utilise different access technologies, for example fixed line, cellular, WLAN,
or broadcast. Some devices will support more than one access technology.
PDE devices will also have a wide range of capabilities. These will vary from
powerful PCs and laptops that are always on; through devices with small
displays and keypads with limited processing and battery power; to personal
sensor devices. Moreover, not all devices will play an active role in the PDE,
for example, peripherals and sensors that simply deliver a service to the user.
PDE devices may also access remote resources across wide area networks.
Hence, the PDE may be regarded as a combination of local devices, connected
using PAN technologies such as Bluetooth4 and ZigBee5; and remote devices
connected via a range of wired or wireless communication technologies such
as fixed line, cellular, WLAN, or broadcast. It should be emphasised that
devices may join and leave the PDE in an unpredictable way, especially those
wireless devices, which may switched off or out of reach. This results in the
dynamic and heterogeneous environment that distinguishes the PDE from
more mature virtual networks.
Figure 1 sketches a PDE, with personal devices originating in different
environments and communicating using a wide range of wired and wireless
communication technologies.
4www.bluetooth.com
5www.zigbee.org
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Figure 1: Overview of the PDE
The PDE provides ubiquitous access to services using all currently avail-
able personal devices and service networks. In doing so, the user preferences,
and the current context, need to be considered. Accessing a service may in-
volve accessing content on another PDE device. For example, a remote user
may wish to access content such as a programme stored on a set-top box
at home. Alternatively the content may originate outside the PDE, such as
incoming email, voice, or broadcast video. In the delivery of services initi-
ated outside the PDE, user preferences and context must be considered. For
example, if a user’s preferences state that email should be forwarded immedi-
ately when the user is traveling in a car, this could require conversion of the
textual email to audio for playback through the car’s onboard communicator.
Such service realisation requires knowledge of the user’s preferences, cur-
rently accessible devices, and their capabilities [6]. To facilitate this, the PDE
requires a Device Management Entity, or DME. The DME is proposed
as the contact point for all incoming services, and as the location database
for PDE devices not in the immediate vicinity. Consequently the DME needs
to be permanently contactable. The DME intelligently directs incoming ses-
sions using the information it possesses. The DME, therefore, maintains
information on all devices in the PDE and their status.
In conclusion, the PDE represents a dynamic and heterogeneous virtual
network that maintains a user-centric view of devices and services. The
security of the underlying network infrastructure however, presents a number
of challenges that must be overcome before the PDE can be realised. Many of
the issues are described in earlier work [19]. In this paper we now propose a
foundation for a secure personal network infrastructure upon which the PDE
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can be based. We introduce a step-by-step initialisation procedure which
goes some way towards the development of the security architecture for the
PDE.
4 Assumptions
As the concept of the PDE is new and the architecture is still being developed,
we have to make certain assumptions regarding its underlying infrastructure
and functionality. In the following, we state the assumptions that have an
impact on the PDE initialisation procedure and the PDE security architec-
ture:
1. As described in section 3, PDE devices exist in a number of differ-
ent environments. Each of these environment is expected to implement
specific local security mechanisms. We assume that the security mecha-
nisms within these security domains are unlikely to be compatible with
each other or with any PDE specific security mechanisms. However,
the local security mechanisms in sub-networks must remain unaffected
by the PDE functionality. Therefore, the PDE security architecture
must inter-operate with legacy security solutions.
2. We assume that PDE devices, or whole PDE sub-networks, may be
unavailable at times. This applies especially to mobile devices, which
may be switched off, conserving power, or simply out of reach.
3. PDE devices have varying capabilities, some of which may be very
limited in nature. Hence, we assume that not all devices will be able
to implement sophisticated security mechanisms, such as those based
on public key cryptography.
4. We assume that some basic PDE management functionality will be
available at all times. Although we do not preclude the option of the
user providing this functionality themselves, we expect that this service
will be provided by a server, or portal, maintained by a PDE service
provider. Placing PDE management functionality on such a central
server has a number of advantages:
• The user can gain access to their PDE without the need to have
physical access to any of their own devices. This may be accom-
plished through the Internet from any IP-enabled device such as
a public terminal. Alternatively the user could access their PDE
via telephone, similar to telephone banking.
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• If the PDE is hosted at a service provider who can provide and
maintain PDE software, the user’s technical involvement can be
kept to a minimum.
• The PDE service provider may be able to offer their own services
to the user, or broker PDE services from other service providers.
5. The last assumption is that the PDE should be robust. Thus, even
if substantial parts of the PDE are unavailable, we assume that the
remaining PDE devices and sub-networks remain operational.
The last two assumptions have further implications on the operation of the
PDE.
While these assumptions are essential to the PDE architecture they are, to
some extent, conflicting. Assumption 4 states that some PDE functionality
should be available on a central server. On the other hand, assumption 5
states that the PDE should be robust. Since the PDE is organised in a
number of sub-networks, this implies that sub-networks are able to operate
independently if global connectivity is lost. However, if this is the case and
some sub-networks have lost connectivity to the PDE server, then the PDE
server cannot give a complete picture of what is going on in the rest of
the PDE. As a consequence, the PDE server will have unsynchronised or
incomplete data about the different sub-networks at different points in time.
5 Initialisation of the PDE
Having described the PDE model, and the assumptions that we make about
this model, we may now describe the methods used to construct the PDE.
Initialisation is a two stage process. The first stage is to create the framework
to support the PDE, the second stage is to register devices to construct the
PDE. Central to this discussion is the notion of the Device Management
Entity, and this is described in more detail before discussing the details of
the initialisation procedure.
5.1 The Device Management Entity
The PDE is a virtual network, and corresponding physical devices have to
be mapped into this virtual network. Consequently, a mapping table must
be created that contains information about the user’s devices and how they
are mapped into the PDE. This mapping table realises the virtual network,
hence it must be globally available to the entire PDE. The mapping table
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must be available to all PDE devices in all PDE sub-networks. Therefore,
this mapping table is stored in the PDE’s Device Management Entity
(DME) [1].
In section 4, we stated that some basic PDE management functionality
should be available on a central server. This management functionality is the
job of the DME. Therefore, some component of the DME should be available
on a central server. In the following discussion, we refer to this as the DME
server component. It is likely that the DME server component will be
hosted by a Trusted Third Party (TTP) - a PDE service provider.
Since assumption 5 states that PDE sub-networks remain operational
even if global connectivity is lost, it can be inferred that DME functionality is
distributed throughput the PDE. Hence, DME components are distributed
within the different sub-networks of the PDE.
In the following, we present the procedure that initialises the PDE, creates
the DME server component and fills the mapping table with corresponding
information during device registration. The mapping table will contain ex-
tensive information on PDE devices, for example, their capabilities, location,
current status, reachability, and security parameters. In section 3 we de-
scribed the notion of home and foreign devices. This distinction is important
when considering the details of the registration procedure, which will depend
on whether we are dealing with a home or foreign device.
The stages of PDE initialisation presented in this section reflect a more
static view of the PDE architecture. In order to accommodate the dynamic
aspects, section 6 considers removing a device from the PDE.
5.2 DME Server Component
Even if the user has no direct access to their own PDE devices, they will
able to gain access to their PDE via the DME server component at the
PDE service provider. The DME server component will contain information
describing the current PDE devices. This data will contain the device’s
identity; time and date of last contact; serving administrative domain, which
indicates the identity of the serving network; currently assigned IP address;
device resources, and security parameters. The DME server component may
also contain information on user location, preferences, and current status.
To access the data on DME server component, all PDE devices must
possess the appropriate security parameters required to communicate with
it. All PDE devices must also possess some information, locally available,
that specifies what the device is authorised to do within the user’s PDE.
These access and authorisation rights apply to the global PDE, and will be
distinct from the device’s local access and authorisation rights.
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As we described in section 4, the DME server component and the local
DME components cannot be fully synchronised, otherwise the PDE could
not be robust. Each DME component must therefore contain sufficient infor-
mation to independently manage its corresponding sub-network. It should
also have knowledge of the other sub-networks in the PDE even if some of
them are currently unavailable.
The first step for a user to create a PDE is to open a PDE account at a
PDE service provider. The user will need to register, and an account will be
created in their name. This process may be very similar to creating a mobile
phone account and the PDE account may indeed be combined with a user’s
mobile phone account. The PDE service provider creates the DME server
component for the user. During this procedure the user is provided with a
globally unique PDE user ID such as julius.caesar.pde, a password, and the
network address of the service provider. This allows the user to login to their
account at the PDE service provider, and gain access to basic PDE manage-
ment functionality. The user may at this time specify their preferences and
enter their service subscriptions. Alternatively, service subscriptions could
be automatically detected when the user adds devices to the PDE. At this
point, the user may also receive the corresponding information and software
for handling their account.
This completes the first stage in initialising the PDE, but although the
DME server component has been created, the PDE does not yet contain any
devices. Therefore the mapping table contains no entries. Figure 2 illustrates
the creation of a DME server component at a PDE service provider for user
julius.caesar.pde. In the following, we describe how devices are registered
with the PDE to populate this newly created mapping table.
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5.3 Registering Home Devices with the PDE
In the above, we described how the user creates an empty PDE by opening
an account at a PDE service provider, who creates a DME server component
with an empty mapping table. We now describe how the user’s home devices
are added to the PDE, and how information about the device is entered into
the mapping table at the DME server component.
5.3.1 PDE Device ID
Each PDE device needs to be allocated a globally unique PDE identifier be-
fore it can be added to the PDE. We call this identifier the PDE Device ID,
or PDE DID. Since the device must be uniquely identifiable by all PDE ser-
vice providers, this identifier must be universal. Since the user has already
been allocated a globally unique PDE username, julius.caesar.pde, each de-
vice can simply concatenate its own device ID to the global ID, for example
PDA.julius.caesar.pde or laptop.julius.caesar.pde. This is a naming method
that is very extensible and also provides names that can be used in the IETF
SIP domain [17] for session set-up.
5.3.2 Software Installation and Device Registration
All devices require some basic PDE communications software that allows the
device to connect to, and authenticate to, the DME server component. How-
ever, not all PDE devices are expected to be IP enabled, and not all devices
are expected to have the computational resources required to efficiently im-
plement complex security mechanisms. Devices with such limited resources,
or legacy devices, may use a more intelligent device as a proxy. For example,
a Bluetooth enabled speaker or display, could use a HiFi or a PC to act as a
proxy. The installation of the PDE software on the device or the proxy can
be performed automatically or manually.
Automated installation: The basic PDE software could be pre-installed,
as is the case with Open Mobile Alliance6 Digital Rights Management
software on mobile phones. In such cases, to register the new device,
the user only needs to provide the network address of the DME server
component, their PDE username, and password. The device can then
contact the DME server component via a secure connection, and us-
ing the password information, authenticate and register itself. Once
registered, the device then uploads information about its features, and
6www.openmobilealliance.org
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the network contracts that it may possess. In this way the DME can
automatically learn of the user’s service contracts. For example, the
user’s UMTS service contract details can be obtained from their mo-
bile phone; their broadcast services contract details can be obtained
from their set-top box; and their email account details obtained from
their laptop. For devices that do not have direct Internet access, a
secondary device that has already authenticated to the DME server
component, acts as a proxy authenticator. The proxy device may con-
nect to the new device allowing the user to validate the password and
DME address. Thus a stolen device cannot be used to add new devices
to the PDE unless the user’s password is also compromised.
Manual installation: In the case of manual initialisation, the PDE service
provider will supply the user with software that they can install on
each device. Since these devices are home devices the user has access
rights, as administrator or user, and can login to their local device
account to install the software. Once the software is installed, the
device becomes PDE-aware and has some component for managing the
PDE. If the user has no administrator rights, this software may have
to be installed by an administrator. The registration procedure can
then proceed by contacting and updating the DME server component
as described above.
As an alternative to either of the above two procedures, the DME server
component may be accessed from any other device via the Internet, and the
new device details manually entered.
This completes the first step of the registration process. The new de-
vice may now communicate with the DME, and the DME is aware of the
new device’s capabilities. In the manual approach the user is required to be
competent at software installation, which may be an impediment to user ac-
ceptance. With the automated approach, the only action user has to perform
is to enter their PDE username, password, and service provider network ad-
dress. From the user perspective, this is not significantly different from the
online banking systems currently in use, and should be quite acceptable.
The automatic approach also eliminates the problem of users being unable
to install software due to problematic hardware/software configurations.
5.3.3 Authorisation and Delegation
An important part of the registration process is to define the authorisation
requirements for the device. A user’s access rights will depend on whether
they are logged on directly to the device, or remotely, through the PDE. The
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user may also permit others to access the device. The device registration
process must, therefore, specify the authorisation requirements and delegate
access rights to the device’s resources. This can be done by explicitly defining
each user, or class of users, who can access the device, and what they can use
the device for in their PDE. These rights must be a subset of the primary
user’s own access rights. One example would be for a user to grant access
rights to a set-top box to a friend or neighbour to allow recording television
programmes. In this case, the primary user would act as a Trusted Third
Party, and the device would be seen by the other user as a potential foreign
device to be added to their own PDE.
Rather than set up authorisation and delegation requirements interac-
tively for each device, it is envisaged that default preferences are defined
during stage one and stored in a user profile on the DME server component.
The default could be for the user to delegate all their access rights on the
local device to the DME component, and therefore make this account com-
pletely accessible via their PDE. Another possibility is that the user specifies
certain applications and data to be accessible to the PDE whereas others,
for example, confidential work data in the office environment, are kept out.
5.3.4 Mapping
From a security perspective, the most important step in the device registra-
tion process is to define the mapping of device security credentials in the
local domain, to their equivalents in the global PDE security domain. By
the end of the preceding step, a device will have a unique PDE DID ; be able
to run PDE software; and have established access requirements. The device
may be able to connect to the DME server and log in, however, it is not part
of the PDE until this mapping is complete.
Each device may exist in a different security domain, for example a home
or office network. Within each security domain the user will have a different
login details. These could be a local user ID and corresponding local security
credentials unique to that domain. The mapping process requires the new
device to be associated with a specific local security domain and local user,
then the user’s local login details must be mapped to their PDE global login
details.
There are two scenarios to consider. After logging in to the candidate
PDE device and starting the PDE software, the user may either:
1. Map the device directly to their PDE using the DME server component
at the PDE service provider.
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Figure 3: Adding a home device to the PDE
2. Map the device indirectly to their PDE using the DME component at
another of their PDE devices - the proxy mentioned in section 5.3.2.
Direct Mapping: The first case, illustrated by figure 3, represents the
default case, where the DME server component at the PDE service
provider is directly accessible. The local login credentials of the user
need to be mapped onto the PDE login credentials defined in stage
one, and the corresponding information entered into the DME server
component. To accomplish this, the user has to identify their PDE
to the PDE service provider (e.g. julius.caesar.pde). A secure tunnel
between the new device and the PDE service provider has to be set up,
then the user provides a password or other credential to login to their
PDE and trigger the registration procedure. This information is sent
to the PDE service provider where it can be verified. Next, both sides
exchange data relating to the new device, for example, its PDE DID,
how it can be reached, and its capabilities. A protocol is then initiated
that derives security parameters for this connection. Therefore, there
are two important security aspects to consider, how the secure tunnel is
set up between the device and the DME server component to transmit
credentials in the first place, and what security protocols are used to
derive the security parameters for the new connection. The latter is
discussed in [20].
Mapping by Proxy: The second case, shown in figure 4, arises when a
user wants to add a candidate device to the PDE, but the DME server
component is not accessible. In this case the user may register the
candidate device via another device in the same sub-network which acts
as a proxy. The DME information identified above is then propagated
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Figure 4: Adding a second home device to the PDE via a proxy
to the DME server component at a later point in time. As was the
case with direct mapping, the user logs in to the candidate device to
be added and starts the PDE software. The proxy device must be up
and running, so that the user can login to the DME component from
the candidate device. Again, credentials to authenticate to the PDE
must be transmitted through a secure tunnel between the candidate
device and the proxy device. Subsequently, a security protocol must
be used to derive the security parameters for the new connection. In
this case, once registered, the candidate device will become aware the
other PDE devices in the sub-network. However it will not be aware
of the PDE devices in other sub-networks and on higher layers of the
PDE hierarchy until the registration data has been propagated to the
DME server component.
In both cases, one more possibility exists to complete the mapping. This
is the case where the PDE software is running on the candidate device and
that the user logs in remotely to the candidate device to perform the mapping
procedure.
5.3.5 Sub-networks
So far, we have described basic registration procedures for home devices
and made reference to the fact that the PDE may be fragmented into sub-
networks. We have not yet considered the structuring of the PDE into sub-
networks. The concept of a sub-network reflects the lower-level topology of
the PDE and specifically the communication protocols at the link layer. The
PDE however, is an application layer concept, built upon a heterogeneous
and dynamic set of protocols on the lower layers.
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The objective of grouping PDE devices into sub-networks arises from
the homogeneity of the lower layer security mechanisms in the corresponding
environments. Another reason is the easy accessibility of PDE devices within
the same environment, for example using WLAN in the home environment,
or Bluetooth in the PAN. In terms of the initialisation procedure, it makes
sense to group PDE devices into sub-networks according to their lower-layer
capabilities. This will have advantages for the management of devices and
services during PDE operations. Thus a PDE sub-network may be considered
to be a fully operational, enclosed entity that can manage itself using a DME
component on one of its devices.
5.4 Registering Foreign Devices with the PDE
Section 5.3 described the registration procedure for home devices. Foreign
devices, by their nature, require a different registration procedure. Foreign
devices are not controlled by the user, but by third parties. Ideally these
devices should be controlled by a Trusted Third Party (TTP), otherwise the
foreign device might compromise the whole of the PDE. A secure procedure
is therefore required to allow foreign devices to be added to the user’s PDE.
This section gives an overview of this procedure.
A precondition for adding a foreign device to a user’s PDE is that the
owner of that device has already installed PDE software on the device. Thus
we may assume that the foreign device is PDE aware and has control over
the resources others may access. When requested, the TTP decides whether
the user is allowed to add this device to their PDE, and if so, for how long.
The right to access the foreign device and add it to the PDE will depend on
the relationship between the TTP and the user. We envisage four possible
cases.
1. The user has access rights to the device in a specific role (e.g. student
of a college, member of a club).
2. The third party knows the user.
3. The user pays for the access.
4. Access is free.
Case 1 means that the user can choose a different identity to their PDE
identity to add the foreign device to their PDE. As with home devices, we
can adapt Grid computing solutions and apply these to the PDE [20]. Case
2 implies that the user knows the owner of the device, who may be a family
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member or friend, who can add the device to their PDE. In both cases the
user knows the specific device that they want to add to their PDE. The owner
of the device needs to delegate access rights to this user, or to an appropriate
class of users. Hence, the third party sets up an account for the user on their
device. This effectively turns the foreign device into a home device and the
user can use the home registration procedure to add the device to their PDE.
In case 3, the user may be leasing the device from a TTP. Then they get
some time-limited access rights which allow them to make the device part of
their PDE. In this case, the TTP will have installed the PDE software with
corresponding access rights for paying users. In case 4, the device is open to
all and does not require payment, similar to anonymous FTP.
Unlike the first two cases, in cases 3 and 4 the user does not know which
specific device they want to add to their PDE: the user only requires that
the device delivers the desired data or services. In the case 3, the user is
willing to pay for this, in the case 4 this is free of charge. Since the user does
not know which specific device offers what they need, they have to contact a
third party to specify their requirements, make a choice, and add the device
to their PDE. This third party services broker may be hosted by the PDE
service provider. The broker may present a choice of PDE devices, and
the user chooses the device that matches their interests best, for example,
which is the most cost-effective. This touches on the Mobile VCE concept
of a “digital marketplace” which is described in more detail in [12] and [11].
Having selected a device, the user has to establish a connection between
their DME and the third party, over which the registration process takes
place. The third party will need to give some security and quality of service
guarantees to the user.
Once the connection has been established, there are two different sub-
cases to consider, depending on the location of the user and the device. The
distinction is between local devices that the user can see, or has physical
access to, and remote devices that can only exchange data with the user.
The location of the user is therefore an important parameter in resource
specification. In the first sub-case the user is remote from the device and
must specify the resource, for example, in terms of the delivered service,
location, or owner. In the second sub-case, the user can access the foreign
device directly and use a simple, manual pairing mechanism such as the
Manual Authentication Protocol described in [10].
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6 Removing a Device from the PDE
Section 5 described the initialisation of the PDE as a two stage process of
setting up the PDE framework, and subsequently adding individual devices
to this framework. This section briefly describes how devices may be removed
from the PDE.
There are several reasons why a device may need to be removed from a
PDE. The device could be temporarily unavailable; permanently unavailable
(stolen, broken, obsolete); or it could be compromised (security parameters
leaked). No action is needed in the first case, when the device will take part
in PDE operations at a later point in time. However, if the device has been
stolen or is permanently unavailable, then it needs to be removed from the
user’s PDE. The procedure to remove a device will depend on whether or not
the device is accessible.
If the device is accessible to the user, they can log in to their PDE ac-
count on the device and trigger a procedure for removing this device from
their PDE. This would involve contacting the DME server component and re-
moving the device’s PDE DID from the mapping table. All local confidential
PDE data then needs to be removed from the device.
If the device is not accessible to the user, they can still log in to their
PDE account at the PDE service provider and remove the device from there.
The DME server component removes the device from its mapping table and
propagates the information to other DME components as fast as possible.
7 Summary, Conclusions, and Future Work
Our objectives in this paper were to describe how a Personal Distributed
Environment may be built upon a collection of dynamic heterogeneous sub-
networks. We described the motivation for this area of research, and iden-
tified other research initiatives that consider purely virtual networks. The
major difference between the PDE and more mature technologies is that the
PDE is designed to support the services and applications of a single user.
The PDE concept takes a user-centric view of consumer devices and merges
them into one environment. The dynamic and heterogeneous nature of this
environment presents a number of research challenges, and this paper has
focussed on the secure initialisation of the PDE.
We described a two stage initialisation procedure that involved the cre-
ation of a framework to support the PDE followed by the registration of
the user’s devices. The creation of the framework introduced the concept
of the DME server and local DME components. The registration procedure
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required a distinction to be made between the user’s home devices and guest
foreign devices. In the latter case the registration procedure depends on the
relationship between the user and the device. We also described how a device
with limited resources may register via a proxy. This is particularly impor-
tant in the PDE where consumer devices may include low-power short-range
devices such as sensors that are not IP enabled and are unlikely to have the
computational resources necessary to run complex cryptographic algorithms.
The work presented here represents the foundation upon which we may
now construct the detailed security architecture for the PDE. The mecha-
nisms for mapping home devices has been defined in previous work [20], and
we are now completing the the procedures to map foreign devices on to the
PDE [2].
Acknowledgements
The work reported in this paper has formed part of the PDE area of the
Core 3 Research programme of the Virtual Centre of Excellence in Mobile and
Personal Communications, Mobile VCE, www.mobilevce.com, whose funding
support, including that of EPSRC, is gratefully acknowledged. Fully detailed
technical reports on this research are available to Industrial Members of Mo-
bile VCE.
References
[1] R. C. Atkinson, J. Dunlop, J. Irvine, and S. Vadgama, “The Personal
Distributed Environment,” in 7th International Symposium on Wireless
Personal Multimedia Communications WPMC-04, Abano Terme, Italy,
Sept. 2004.
[2] K. L. Billington and A. Tomlinson, “Mutual Authentication of B3G de-
vices within Personal Distributed Environments,” in Fifth International
Conference on 3G Mobile Communications Technologies, 3G 2004. Lon-
don, UK: IEE, Oct. 2004, pp. 452–456.
[3] Bluetooth, “Specification of the Bluetooth system,” Bluetooth, Tech.
Rep. v1.2, Nov. 2003. [Online]. Available: http://www.bluetooth.org/
foundry/adopters/document/Bluetooth Core Specification v1.2
[4] N. Cam-Winget, R. Housley, D. Wagner, and J. Walker, “Security flaws
in 802.11 data link protocols,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 46,
no. 5, pp. 35–39, 2003.
20
[5] N. Doraswamy and D. Harkins, IPSec : The new security standard for
the Internet, intranets, and virtual private networks, 2nd ed., ser. Web
Infrastructure series. Upper Saddle River, N.J: Prentice Hall, 2003.
[6] J. Dunlop, R. C. Atkinson, J. Irvine, and D. Pearce, “A Personal Distrib-
uted Environment for Future mobile systems,” in Proc. 12th IST Mobile
and Wireless Communications Summit. Aviero, Portugal: IST, June
2003, pp. 705–709.
[7] I. Foster, C. Kesselman, J. M. Nick, and S. Tuecke, “The physiology
of the Grid - an open grid services architecture for distributed systems
integration,” Global Grid Forum, Tech. Rep., June 2002. [Online].
Available: http://www.globus.org/research/papers/ogsa.pdf
[8] I. Foster, C. Kesselman, and S. Tuecke, “The anatomy of the Grid:
enabling scalable virtual organization,” The International Journal
of High Performance Computing Applications, vol. 15, no. 3, pp.
200–222, Aug. 2001. [Online]. Available: http://www.globus.org/
research/papers/anatomy.pdf
[9] D. Garlan, D. Siewiorek, A. Smailagic, and P. Steenkiste, “Project Aura:
Toward distraction-free pervasive computing,” IEEE Pervasive Comput-
ing, pp. 22–31, Apr. 2002.
[10] C. Gehrmann, C. J. Mitchell, and K. Nyberg, “Manual authentication
for wireless devices,” Cryptobytes, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 29–37, 2004.
[11] S. K. Goo, J. M. Irvine, J. Dunlop, A. Tomlinson, and S. Schwiderski-
Grosche, “Security Requirements for Mobile Service Provision via a Digi-
tal Marketplace (Invited Paper),” in 11th European Wireless Conference,
EW ’05, vol. 2, VDE. Nicosia, Cyprus: VDE Verlag, Apr. 2005, pp.
573–581.
[12] J. Irvine, “Adam Smith Goes Mobile: Managing Services Beyond 3G
with the Digital Marketplace (Invited Paper),” in European Wireless
2002. Florence, Italy: EUREL, Feb. 2002. [Online]. Available:
http://docenti.ing.unipi.it/ew2002/proceedings/QoS001.pdf
[13] ISO/IEC, “Information technology - telecommunications and informa-
tion exchange between systems - local and metropolitan area networks
- specific requirements - part 11: Wireless LAN medium access con-
trol (MAC) and physical layer (PHY),” International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), Geneva, Switzerland, ISO Standard ISO/IEC
8802-11:1999, 1999.
21
[14] W. Mohr, “WWRF - The Wireless World Research Forum,”Electronics
and Communication Engineering Journal, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 283–291,
Dec. 2002.
[15] ——,“The Wireless World Research Forum - WWRF,”Computer Com-
munications, vol. 26, pp. 2–10, Jan. 2003.
[16] P. Pangalos, K. A. Chew, N. Sattari, A. Tomlinson, R. Atkinson, H. Agh-
vami, and R. Tafazolli, “The Mobile VCE Architecture for the Inter-
working of Mobile and Broadcast Networks,” in 11th European Wireless
Conference, EW ’05, vol. 2, VDE. Nicosia, Cyprus: VDE Verlag, Apr.
2005, pp. 823–828.
[17] J. Rosenberg, H. Schulzrinne, G. Camarillo, A. Johnston, J. Peterson,
R. Sparks, M. Handley, and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Proto-
col,” IETF, RFC 3261, June 2002.
[18] M. Satyanarayanan, “Pervasive Computing: Vision and Challenges,”
IEEE Personal Communications Magazine, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 10–17,
Apr. 2001.
[19] S. Schwiderski-Grosche, A. Tomlinson, S. K. Goo, and J. M. Irvine,
“Security Challenges in the Personal Distributed Environment,” in 60th
Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC Fall ’04. Los Angeles, USA:
IEEE, Sept. 2004.
[20] A. Tomlinson and S. Schwiderski-Grosche, “Application of Grid Security
to Personal Distributed Environments,” in First International Workshop
on Grid Computing and its Application to Data Analysis GADA ’04,
ser. LNCS OTM Workshops, R. Meersman, Ed., vol. 3292. Cyprus:
Springer-Verlag, Oct. 2004, pp. 68–78.
[21] WWRF,“The book of visions 2001,”WWRF, IST - WSI Project Version
1.1, Dec. 2001.
22
